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Attracting foreign direct investments – Recommendations for Belarus for tapping its full potential

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Attracting foreign direct investments – Recommendations for Belarus for tapping its full potential

Executive Summary

The attraction of foreign direct investments (FDI) is crucial for Belarus for three reasons: Firstly, FDI can contribute to modernizing Belarus' industrial basis. Secondly, FDI inflows are stable and long-term capital inflows that support the balance of payments and thus the external sector of the country. Thirdly, FDI may help to diversify the Belarusian economy, if FDI is linked with access to new markets.

Our analysis shows that Belarus has more potential for attracting and absorbing FDI than it actually uses. The analysis uses sophisticated econometric models and reveals an untapped potential of up to 50% of current FDI inflows. A similar picture emerges when studying international FDI attraction benchmarks. Belarus can compete in the global market in some factors that are important for investor decision-making such as the availability of educated workforce. However, Belarus is far behind when it comes to the regulative and legal environment and investor support. The first is a long-term task for all state institutions as pointed out in many policy recommendations already. The latter is usually a task assigned to a so-called Investment Promotion Agency (IPA). Although most countries possess such an IPA, Belarus has no comparable institution. The current National Agency of Investment and Privatization (NAIP) is far away from the international IPA success model with respect to its mandate, power, budget and capacity and should be thus reformed.

Accordingly, we recommend the following changes and adjustments in the approach and organization of the investment promotion process in Belarus:

- Separate greenfield FDI promotion and privatization
- Focus on the efficiency of investment promotion measures
- Improve the visibility of administrative responsibilities
- Improve the credibility of investment promotion
- Improve the autonomy of the IPA with respect to staffing and funding

These changes will not offset the poor current macro-economic environment and the unfavorable regulative business environment, but they are steps worth taking.

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1 Introduction

Foreign direct investments (FDI) could act as a motor for economic growth and welfare. Benefits of FDI include access to international goods markets, new employment, import substitution, contributions to regional development, strengthening of export capacity and the generation of knowledge spill-over with respect to technology, skills, experience.


FDI are of special interest for Belarus, because FDI is a means of supporting the balance of payment since it is -of its nature - a long-term and stable capital inflow. Other East European economies have been very successful in continuously attracting and promoting FDI. They prove that FDI can contribute much to a country's economic and technological development.

Belarus has performed rather poor with respect to FDI attraction, compared to most of its peer countries. This paper aims at contributing to the effort of supporting Belarus to catch up with its peers. The paper is organized as follows. Chapter two analyzes the gap between Belarus' potential and its current FDI inflows. Chapter three highlights the most important impediments for FDI in Belarus. Chapter four derives policy recommendations, taking into account international best practice.

2 Gap-analysis of potential versus actual FDI inflow in Belarus

The analysis of the FDI stock in the Belarusian economy shows that the country is not as attractive for investors as its neighbors in the CEE. During the period 2000-2014 the FDI stock per capita in Belarus was comparable to that of Ukraine but lagged behind almost all Eastern European countries, as well as Russia and Kazakhstan. Czech Republic and Hungary were ahead of all the others in FDI per capita terms (see figure 1).

Figure 1: FDI stock per capita in CEE and CIS countries (USD)



Source: Authors' calculation based on UNCTAD data (World Investment Report 2014)

In terms of FDI inflow per capita, Belarus was also behind such countries as Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia and the Eurasian Economic Union countries.

Given such low figures of FDI flows in Belarus in comparison to other Eastern European and Eurasian countries, we made an attempt to assess the potential amount of FDI that can be attracted to the country based on main factors influencing foreign investment decisions, which are considered in the literature. In other words, we try to explore whether there is a gap between the received FDI and the value of FDI that would be expected on the basis of such factors as the size of the economy of Belarus, labor force quality, institutional quality, business environment and macroeconomic stability.

In order to make an assessment of potential FDI inflow in Belarus we run the regression analysis (see Box 1). It revealed that the potential FDI inflow in 2014 could be USD 3.8 bn. That means there is a gap between potential and actual FDI in Belarus. According to the National Bank of Belarus the actual FDI flow in 2014 was USD 1.8 bn. The same situation was in 2013, when the actual inflow was USD 2.2 bn. and the potential level of FDI was much higher and amounted to USD 4.6 bn. In other words, Belarus receives less FDI than it could be expected considering the market size, quality of labor force and rank in "Doing Business" index.

Box 1: Methodology of assessing FDI potential

Initially, following the approach of Alfaro L. (2003) the equation was based on the cross-sectional analysis and included such determinants of FDI attraction as GDP per capita (proxy for market size), secondary school enrollment (proxy for human capital), openness to trade, inflation and unemployment. We examined the influence of these determinants on FDI attraction to 24 European and Central Asian countries with economies in transition.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LogFDI per cap} = b_0 + \text{LogGDP per cap } b_1 + \text{LogSSI } b_2 + \text{LogTariff } b_3 + \\ + \text{Inf } b_4 + \text{LogUn } b_5 + \varepsilon \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

The dependent variable is FDI inflow per capita. In the equation GDP was also measured per capita. SSI is secondary school enrolment, Tariff – openness to trade, Inf – inflation and Un – unemployment.


After running the regression, we found that Tariff, Inf and Un have a weak relationship with responsible variable.

Therefore, we calculated the impact of GDP per capita and secondary school enrollment on FDI inflow per capita for the years 2013 and 2014 in the economies in transition including a dummy variable for countries which gives outliers based on the following equation:

$$\ln Y = a_i + a_1 \ln GDP + a_2 \ln SSI + a_3 \text{Dummies} + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

To test whether there is a relationship between FDI and some other factors we ran separate regressions, which allowed us to reveal influence of inflation (as a proxy for macroeconomic stability) and index of property rights protection (as a proxy for institutional quality) on foreign direct investments attraction in transition economies.

Figure 2: Correlation between FDI inflow per capita (USD) and inflation (% p.a.)



Source: Authors' calculations


Based on the obtained regressions, we can assume that if Belarus had the average inflation level in the CEE region of 3.6% it might have attracted USD 2.2 bn in 2014. Since there is also a relationship between the index of property rights protection (Heritage Foundation)¹ and inflow of FDI (see Figure 3) in transition economies, we can expect that FDI inflow may increase by USD 350m if the index becomes the same as in the region.

The results of our assessments are presented in figures 3 and 4, which depict the gap between potential and actual FDI inflow in Belarus in 2013 and 2014. The first bar displays the results obtained from equation 2. Estimation of potential FDI attraction presented at the second and the third bar are based on the correlation between FDI inflow per capita and Index of property

¹ „The property rights component is an assessment of the ability of individuals to accumulate private property, secured by clear laws that are fully enforced by the state. It measures the degree to which a country’s laws protect private property rights and the degree to which its government enforces those laws. It also assesses the likelihood that private property will be expropriated and analyzes the independence of the judiciary, the existence of corruption within the judiciary, and the ability of individuals and businesses to enforce contracts”. <http://www.heritage.org/index/rule-of-law>


rights protection and correlation between FDI inflow per capita and inflation presented in Figure 3 and 2 respectively.

Figure 3: Correlation between FDI inflow per capita (USD) and Index of property rights protection




Source: own calculations

Figure 4: The gap between potential and actual FDI inflow in 2014 (USD bn)



Source: own calculations

Figure 5: The gap between potential and actual FDI inflow 2013 (USD bn)



Source: own calculations

3 Understanding the impediments for FDI in Belarus

It is important to understand investment reasoning and decision-making in order to fully understand the impediments for FDI: Potential investors base their decisions about the destinations of their investments mainly on expectations.

In order to build expectations, investors use available data to forecast future development. Information about the current situation in the country does matter only with respect for shaping future expectations. In other words, the most relevant factors for investment reasoning are based on the future outlook of the countries development. This is important for promotion strategies: instead of praising Belarus current data, it is more efficient to praise prosperous future scenarios.

Table 1 highlights the most important factors that are considered by investors when selecting FDI destinations, together with some compressed assessment of the conditions of these factors in Belarus. As table 1 shows, some factors are quite good in international comparison, but some form strong impediments that hinder the inflow of FDI to Belarus. The following sections of this chapter briefly describe the most relevant impediments.

Table 1: Factors of investors' decision-making

Factors that are relevant for FDI decision making		Conditions in Belarus
Macroeconomic stability	Inflation rate Aggregate demand Exchange rate	High and volatile inflation rate Decrease of aggregate demand Unpredictable exchange rate development, currency regulation External shocks
Regulative and legal environment	Company formation regulation	Registering a company is efficient, but regulation of all other permissions and

	Compliance costs and regulatory burden	licenses necessary for starting operations is inefficient High compliance costs and massive regulatory burden
	Labour market regulation	Very restrictive labour market regulation
	Secure property rights, especially protection against expropriation and state interference	Not always secure property rights, state interference regularly occurring
Labor market	Availability of skilled and experienced workforce Labour costs	Good availability of educated workforce (at least with respect to formal education) Competitive labour costs (in comparison to EU countries)
Infrastructure	Availability of business related infrastructure such as business parks Availability of land plots	Limited availability of premises for manufacturing at adequate standard/quality; difficult to lease/rent Purchasing land is very difficult
Taxation	Tax burden Administrative burden of tax regulation Tax incentives for FDI	Moderate tax burden (in comparison to EU countries) High administrative burden of tax regulation Tax incentives schemes are inefficient: too many schemes, untransparent, confusing for investors

Sources: Own illustration, based on own research and other studies as listed in the Appendix

3.1 Macroeconomic instability

The current unfavorable macroeconomic situation is responsible for braking out planned investment projects. The most important obstacles of the current macroeconomic situation are:

- High and volatile inflation rate
- Decreasing domestic demand
- Unpredictable exchange rate development and a restrictive, unpredictable currency regulation system

It is important to notice that the current macroeconomic situation hinders those planned investment projects that are already in the pipeline. It puts these projects on hold until the situation improves. However, for filling the future pipeline of FDI projects, other factors are more important as we will describe below.

3.2 Problematic outlook for the development of the regulative environment

One of the most important impediments is the problematic outlook for the development of the regulative environment. As explained already, attracting new FDI means convincing potential investors of Belarus being an interesting FDI destination in the long run. The players of the

global FDI market focus on long-term forecasts, specifically on the forecasts of the regulative environment. And these forecasts on the development of the regulative environment are rather bad for Belarus. Table 3 highlights some of the most influential international rankings with respect to the regulative and legal environment. Those rankings have influence on investors' decision-makings. As table 3 shows, there has been almost no improvement between 2010 and 2015. Future expectations about the future development of the regulative environment are based on the bad performance in the past, since investors extrapolate data about the past into the future.

As a result of the unfavorable outlook, there are only few FDI projects in the pipeline. That means that in the case the macroeconomic situation should improve in the short-term, FDI will not increase significantly, because only those projects that are on hold will proceed. An improvement of the macroeconomic alone will not attract many more FDI projects. Only when the long-term outlook for the regulative environment improves, the FDI project pipeline will start to fill.

This is important for Belarus' FDI strategy. Although Belarus faces currently macroeconomic instability, Belarus can still start immediately with measurements to improve the attractiveness for FDI. Passively waiting would be the worst out of all strategic options.

Table 2: The investment climate of Belarus in international comparison

Report	Position of Belarus	Year of the report	Position of Belarus	Year of the report
World Bank "Doing Business"	58 (of 189)	2010	57 (of 189)	2015
State administration quality (World Bank Institute "Worldwide Governance Indicators")	186 (of 211)	2010	173 (of 211)	2013
Index of economic freedom (from The Heritage Foundation (the USA) and Fraser institute (Canada) "Index of Economic Freedom")	150 (of 179)	2010	153 (of 178)	2015
Index of prosperity (rating of Legatum Institute "Legatum Prosperity Index Report")	54 (of 142)	2010	53 (of 142)	2014
Index of property rights protection (Rating of International Property Rights Index from Property Rights Alliance)	141 (of 178)	2010	141 (of 178)	2014
Index of economic globalization (The KOF Index of Globalization)	117 (of 208)	2010	106 (of 207)	2015
Evaluation of market transformations depth (European Bank for Reconstruction and Development "Transition Report. Innovation in Transition")	28 (of 29)	2010	34 (of 35)	2014
Index of corruption perception (Transparency International Corruption Perception Index)	127 (of 178)	2010	119 (of 175)	2014

Sources: See list of references in appendix, own calculations.

3.3 Non-business-related uncertainty

A problematic outlook makes business difficult but not impossible. High risks associated with doing business will decrease the number of investors, but as long as the risks are known, there will always be some investors left that are still interested in investing. Known risks can be assessed and compared to the expected returns of the business, and in some cases the profitability will be sufficient enough to invest. The problem arises when the risks are not known, which is quite often the case for Belarus.

There are two types of incalculable risks for investors in Belarus. The first type emerges from non-business-related expectations from state authorities and state administrations towards businesses. Examples are: requirements for job guarantees, production targets, non-business-related expenditures such as non-financial and/or financial support to local institutions (build a kindergarten etc.). One of the problems is that Belarusian authorities sometimes communicate their expectations not clear enough. Such social obligations are very unusual in international comparison. Therefore, investors might regard it as voluntary rather than mandatory. Authorities must point out their requirements very clear and repeatedly during negotiation processes, so that the investors are really aware of the risks.

The second type of incalculable risks is state interference on business decision-making. These interferences are uncontrollable external factors and make business planning impossible. Since investment planning is all about business planning and business forecasting, the danger of unpredictable state interferences hinders investment projects even before the state interference actually occurs.

For FDI selection processes, potential investors rely not only on standardized rankings such as sketched in table 3. Even more important is the mouth-to-mouth communication of the international investors' scene. The global FDI community is quite dense and well organized, that is why information about good and bad individual investor's experience spread very easily globally. Existing investors are very important for the same reason, because they are a source of information for potential investors. That is why existing investors must be treated with respect, too. Investment promotion is not only about canvassing new, but also about caring for existing investors. Satisfied investors help promoting the country at no additional costs. The challenge is, that bad experiences have much higher weight than good experiences. As a rule of thumb: One unsatisfied investor outweighs the opinions of ten satisfied investors. In other words, every disappointed investor is a heavy loss in FDI attracting effort.

3.4 Inefficient FDI attraction approach

Apparently, some state institutions and authorities seem to mix up the ideas of FDI attraction and fundraising. Some of the responsible bodies seem to look for someone who provides financial funds, bears the full down-side risk of the business, lets the state participate of the returns and even lets the state influence decision-making. Such an approach will never match with the interests of any private investors. An investor (by definition) requires full control of the enterprise and full control of the profit returns as a compensation for the risks he takes. Targeting the FDI market with incompatible expectations will lead nowhere. Similar experiences of failure are known from other transition countries that used to be Soviet-Union member states. As an example, Ukraine followed such an approach and called it "National Projects (NatsProekts)". The Ukrainian investment promotion agency was busy for some years

with trying to find buyers for its “national projects” and failed completely. Belarus can learn from such failure.

3.5 Long and expensive administrative procedures

In case an investor is, despite all impediments described above, still willing to cope with the high risks and high uncertainty of doing business in Belarus, there are still obstacles during the process of investing.

Firstly, there are too many institutions involved in the processes of negotiation. Investors have to negotiate with several line ministries (especially with respect to privatization issues), with local authorities (esp. regarding land plots), with state administrations and state agencies (for registration, licenses, permissions) etc. This means high transaction costs and high risks for investors and puts – therefore – Belarus behind other FDI destination countries.

Secondly, investors find it difficult to identify what institution is really in charge. There are some rumours in the investors’ scene about negotiations that have been closed successful, but in the end it turned out that the negotiating institution was not accountable and some other state authority suddenly stopped the investment process. No matter whether or not such anecdotes are true or partly true, but they still contribute to a certain negative reputation of Belarus in the global investment scene.

Thirdly, processes are too long. Currently, big-scale FDI projects need between 1.5 and 2 years from starting negotiating the investment agreement until getting all licenses, permissions and certifications needed for starting operations. This is much too long for high-tech industries, which circumvent Belarus for that reason. The same goes for industries that want to utilize labor-cost differences, because such industries move their factories rather fast. Thus, Belarus cannot tap that potential.

4 Recommendations

The most important measures for attracting more FDI are firstly stabilising the macro economy and secondly improving the regulative and legal business environment. We have pointed that out in many previous policy papers, and so did a variety of other development partner organisations. These two are long-term tasks that require huge effort.

For this paper, we derived some practical recommendations that are easy to implement and do neither require a lot of expenditure nor big effort. Instead we suggest some adjustments of the current FDI promotion practice of Belarus. The recommendations are based on international experience and address the impediments identified. They will not be able to offset the poor macro-economic and regulative environment, but they are small steps to start with.

4.1 Separate greenfield FDI promotion and privatization

In transition countries of former Soviet Union, brownfield FDI promotion means in many cases privatization of state property.

Privatization and new greenfield investment attraction are very different activities on different markets. Potential buyers of state property on one hand and potential greenfield investors on the other hand are different target audiences with different needs and expectations; they use different information sources, different partners, visit different investment fairs etc. The state

institutions and people responsible for investment attraction would need different skill-sets, different competencies, different experiences and different networks in order to meet successfully the needs of the two separate target groups. Therefore, it is recommendable to set up two different state agencies: one investment promotion agency (IPA) that focuses on greenfield investment and one agency that focuses on privatization. This is according to international best practice. Belarus has currently one agency for both tasks, namely the National Agency for Investment and Privatization (NAIP). We recommend considering splitting the tasks and appoint two different agencies.

4.2 Focus on the efficiency of investment promotion measures

According to international best practice, an IPA covers all of the following steps of the investment process:²

- 1) Image marketing: information dissemination to potential foreign investors and building a positive image of the country as an investment destination
- 2) Direct targeting/direct marketing of selected investors in high potential sectors
- 3) Investment facilitation, e.g. pre-investment and implementation services
- 4) Post-investment care services, e.g. facilitate ongoing operations and expansion investments
- 5) Policy advocacy, e.g. improving general investment climate through systematic research about investor's needs and problems

For reasons described already in chapter 3, the activities "3) investment facilitation" and "4) Post-investment care" are the most effective promotion measures according to international experience (see also Box 2 for international best practices). Satisfied investors serve as a very efficient promotion channel in the global investors scene. Therefore, we recommend that NAIP (resp. the future Belarusian IPA) concentrates much more on these activities.

This means for instance that key account managers regularly visit existing foreign investors to listen to their problems, successes and their opinions. Even if the key account managers cannot offer much assistance, caring for investors' opinions and listen to their problems would raise the image of NAIP (resp. the future Belarusian IPA) among investors. It would require no additional costs apart from some travelling costs, but it would make a big difference.

Consequently, we recommend that NAIP (resp. the future Belarusian IPA) focuses less on activities concerning "1) Image marketing". Especially the measure "Investment Forum" is a very ineffective measure; experience from other transition countries underline this statement. Travels abroad to conduct "Road shows" or visit international fairs are also a waste of resources. The time and budget, which has been lost at such ineffective activities, could be used much better for investment facilitation and post-investment care.

Accordingly, we recommend resisting from creating a new consulting service at NAIP. Again, it costs much time and money and has no expected results, neither for potential investors nor for Belarus.

² OECD (2006).

4.3 Improve the visibility of administrative responsibilities

Investors need clarity. Therefore we recommend reducing the number of authorities that are involved in negotiations with potential investors, in licensing, permissions etc. Above all, it must be absolutely clear, which of the authorities is really in charge.

Further, it is important for investors to have one single point of first contact that can easily be found and approached for information and support. Therefore, only one single authority or agency should be responsible for receiving and processing investor inquiries and afterwards channeling qualified inquiries to other investment intermediaries.

We do not provide a recommendation regarding the decision whether to improve the existing NAIP or create a complete new IPA.

In case NAIP should serve as such a Single-point-of-first-contact, many changes are necessary.

The legal framework for the IPA must state clearly, for what matters the IPA is in charge: what exactly is the negotiation mandate and power of the IPA.

Moreover, Belarus needs a clear definition of the division of tasks between the IPA, the line ministries and local authorities. Having such a definition of division of tasks, all institutions must cooperate with each other and support each other. Currently, NAIP and line ministries and local authorities apparently compete with each other. Such a competition of institutions results in a waste of resource on one hand, and a loss in visibility on the other hand. Changing the current model into a supportive model would cost absolutely no additional money but would instead save a lot of resources and help Belarus to tap more of its FDI potential.

Last but not least, the NAIP office would need some changes. The current NAIP office is difficult to find and there is no welcome desk. Moreover, the security at the lobby does not speak English, which is actually a knock-out criterion. A little reconstruction of the NAIP entrance lobby and a friendly welcome assistant that speaks at least English are minor changes that cost little money but make big differences for the visibility.

4.4 Improve the credibility of investment promotion

As explained in detail, investment attraction is all about investor's expectation management. The worst thing that could happen is the disappointment of an investor's expectations. Therefore we recommend resisting from painting over-optimistic futures scenarios, make-ups and exaggerations. It is better to confront potential investors with a realistic assessment of all known problems and impediments. Again, impediments make business difficult, but unreliable information make business planning impossible.

This recommendation refers to both, the marketing of investments opportunities and the self-marketing of the investment promotion agency. As an example for the latter issue: the NAIP calls itself a One-Stop-Shop, which is an exaggeration. The current NAIP has little negotiating power, i.e. cannot replace the negotiations with other state authorities. NAIP cannot shorten administrative procedures. NAIP has not enough autonomy, not enough capacity and not enough budget to act as One-Stop-Shop comparable to international practice. Therefore, it should not claim to be a One-Stop-Shop, because investors would figure that out very easily and develop mistrust.

4.5 Improve the autonomy of the IPA

We recommend following the international approach and create a strong and comprehensive IPA. As said already, we do not provide a recommendation regarding the decision whether to improve the existing NAIP or create a complete new IPA. In any case, the future IPA would need more autonomy in several aspects.

Firstly, the future IPA needs autonomy with respect to recruiting, staffing and retaining personnel. Currently, the NAIP employees are underpaid and therefore usually leave after a couple of years. In order to attract and retain skilled and experienced personnel with appropriate language skills, private sector experiences and specific industry knowledge, the IPA would need the autonomy to negotiate adequate compensation schemes with competitive salaries and state-of-the-art bonus schemes.

Secondly, the future IPA needs more autonomy with respect to additional fund raising. Since its current budget is insufficient, the IPA should be allowed to generate additional income or receive other additional funds. However, the IPA should not compete with private sector services, as this would cause crowding-out effects.

5 Concluding remarks

There are two major tasks for attracting more FDI to Belarus.

In order to increase the FDI potential, Belarus must improve the macro-economic stability and the regulative framework conditions.

In order to fully tap the FDI potential, Belarus must improve the investment promotion and investment support procedures.

Belarus can start immediately with the latter task, because all measures proposed in this paper need little additionally money and are supported by international best-practice experience.

Box 2: Success factors of investment promotion agencies

Strategic success factors

The most successful IPAs focus on priority industries. The IPA management together with the government identifies those industries with the highest short-term and sustainable long-term impact on the country's economic development. All promotion instruments and the organizational design of the IPA are in line with the specific characteristics of the targeted industries and the specific needs of the target group.

Effective Instruments

The most effective and cost-efficient instrument of the world's leading IPAs is the use of account managers. The account manager supports an investor through the entire investment life-cycle from first contact to successful investment implementation.

Organizational success factors

The world's leading IPAs operate with a high degree of operational freedom. The IPA strategy is defined by the policy makers. The IPA-Management then can decide on its own about the allocation of necessary resources in order to achieve the strategic goals.

In order to ensure operational freedom, most of the world's leading IPAs are autonomous bodies, reporting directly to the government at top-level.

Having operational freedom does not mean that the IPA has no accountability. Quite the opposite: The best IPAs use a systematic monitoring and reporting system. Promotion and support processes are monitored, together with the progress of investment. This is important for evaluating the effectiveness and efficiency of the instruments.

The most important organizational success factor is the employment of skilled and experienced staff. The best IPAs employ people with private sector experience, specific sector knowledge, industry network linkages and appropriate language skills. In order to attract and retain talented staff, the IPA needs to pay its staff with competitive salaries and bonuses according to private sector benchmarks; and for that it needs a sufficient and sustainable funding.

Further success factors derived from international benchmarks are summarized under the term 'visibility and accessibility', which includes a state-of-the-art website, an easy-to-reach office and quick responses to investor's inquiries. In order to achieve strategic goals with a maximum effectiveness, the world's best IPAs enjoy strong political support by the national government. The last important success factor is 'credibility' and means providing foreign investors with a clear and balanced picture of investment advantages and disadvantages.

Sources: UNCTAD (2010); World Bank Group (2004), (2009a), (2009b); OSCE (2006); OECD (2006).

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